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Abstract: 
Using Bayesian updating to deterministic priors persistence of fundamentalist belief like 
those in the mind of a terrorist is explained. Under such belief system if conditional evidence 
is diametrically opposite and also deterministic then a process of change will set in and in the 
present war against terrorism this can be effectively done through Islamic religious 
authorities. In situations where interaction is the basis, self-defeating scenarios can be 
avoided by giving space to others’. Thus, in the political sphere one has to be accommodative 
about the concerns of Middle East, this will also make things easier for intervention through 
Islam. 
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“PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.” 
de Finetti (1970, p. x) 
 
1 Introduction 
Bayesian interpretation of probability is epistemic – a degree of belief, as against the 
frequentist tradition where it is a limiting ratio of a repeatable phenomena (Howie, 2002, p.1). 
In situations where it is difficult or impossible to obtain repeatable events like the occurrence 
of terrorist strike tomorrow the probability formed will be a belief about something that one 
is uncertain about (von Plato, 1994, p. 240).
1 This belief in a Bayesian sense is based on prior 
information and conditional evidence;
2 or, statistically one calculates posteriors that are 
reciprocal to priors and conditional evidence (Zellner, 1987, p. 208). In other words, prior 
information based hypothesis and conditional evidence can through Bayes’ rule update the 
prior to posterior hypothesis such that the posterior can be a new prior, which with further 
conditional evidence will lead to subsequent updating (Lange, 1999, p. 294). The present 
paper seeks to understand fundamentalist belief such as those by the perpetrators of 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack through Bayesian interpretation. It considers the nature of 
fundamentalist belief to have a prior hypothesis that is deterministic – total disbelief, zero or 
total conviction, unity, and as a result posteriors will be equal to priors, and hence, 
deterministic – no amount of updating is going to change a fundamentalist belief. Does this 
mean that once a fundamentalist, always a fundamentalist? Two possible suggestions are 
given and a combination of these will be relevant in our present concern against terrorism. 
 
Explaining the persistence of a fundamentalist belief is a definite strength of Bayesian 
analysis, as the framework is meant to analyze something that one is uncertain about. 
However, if there exists sufficient scientific evidence that is also deterministic but contrary to 
prior then there is room for posterior to be different. An illustration is given with Kepler’s use 
of Brahe’s data to discover planetary laws of motion that conclusively proved Copernicus’ 
heliocentric view (sun at the center) as against Church backed geocentric view (earth at the 
center) of Brahe and thus dispelled the then prevailing popular belief (Guidry, 2002A, 2002B 
& 2002C). 
                                                 
1 Usage of frequentist probability, in Baccini’s (2001) understanding of Edgeworth and Venn, 
cannot be of much help for choice under uncertainty; however, subjective probability in a 
Bayesian sense, as conceptualised by Frank Ramsey, has done remarkably well as a theory of 
rational decisions that led Davidson (1996) to even suggests such an approach for a theory of 
truth. Independent of the philosophical underpinnings of frequentist of Bayesian approach, 
Beebee & Papineau (1997) suggest that a prudentially correct choice is that of relative 
probability - subjective probability relative to knowledge set-up, as it will help one to act on, 
given that one wants such-and-such results. 
2 In a Bayesian framework prior probability is a degree of belief about the universe, and 
hence, any evidence from the universe is considered as conditional to the priors. It is for this 
that we use the term conditional evidence as against evidence; one can also refer to 
conditional evidence as sample proportions. Eckhardt (1997, pp. 247-248) points out that any 
evidence that is not connected to priors or that is outside the domain of the universe will not 




Alternatively, if one has to retain the uncertain nature of outcomes then it is proposed that the 
values of zero and unity remain out of bounds. Thus, ensuring scope for revision. It is based 
on the premise that no knowledge is final; there is always scope for change. Interestingly, 
such an approach is consistent with multiplicity of views, or debates arising thereof. In fact, it 
is these that can also ensure change – say, emergence of a new middle position that could not 
be visualized earlier. 
 
After this introductory section, section 2 introduces some notations and explains Bayes’ rule. 
Section 3 explains impossibility of updating fundamentalist belief. Section 4 shows how 
under special situations there is room for fundamentalist belief to change. Section 5 discusses 
a possible scope for Bayesian updating that accommodates multiple views. Concluding 
discussions are in section 6. 
 
2 Notations and Bayes’ Rule
3 
Prior information based hypothesis, h, conditional evidence, e| h, and posterior hypothesis, 
h| e, have their complementary denoted with a prefix Not, ~, and probability distributions, 
p(·), such that through axiom of certainty  
 
(1)  ∑ p(·)=1 
 
Further, as per Bayes’ rule  
 
(2) p(h| e)={p(e| h)× p(h)}/[{p(e| h)× p(h)}+{p(e| ~h)× p(~h)}] 
 
If we introduce the notion of time, t=1, ..., T, to incorporate a series of conditional evidences 
such that at each t equations (1) and (2) hold, but in addition to this one further assumes that 
posterior at time t is prior at time t+1. 
 
(3) p(h| e)t= p(h)t+1 
 
3 Persistence of Fundamentalist Belief 
One considers belief to be persistent if the posterior is the same as the prior, or, in other 
words conditional evidence has no impact on changing the belief. This happens in two 
situations: when conditional evidences of mutually exclusive scenarios are equally likely; in 
equation (2) this can be the case when p(e| h)=p(e| ~h)=0.5. This is so because conditional 
evidences give equal weight to all possible scenarios and as a result the weights that matter 
are that of the priors only. For instance, if after scientifically examining shape, size and 
structure of a coin the priors that the toss of a particular type of coin will be heads is 0.8 and 
that of tails is 0.2. However, after ten throws one has conditional evidence that getting heads 
or tails is equally likely. Calculating posteriors using Bayes’ rule will show that they will be 
the same as priors: heads 0.8 and tails 0.2. Now, let us go to the second situation, as it is 
relevant for the present discussion. 
 
The second situation where posterior is equal to prior is when prior is based on 
fundamentalist belief, that is, prior is deterministic and takes the values of zero or unity. 
                                                 
3 Discussion in Howie (2002, p. 30), Howson & Urbach (1989, pp. 284-288), Lange (1999), 
Lindley (1987), Press and Tanur (2001, p. 207), and Qin (1998) were of help.      Page 4 of 11 
 
 
There is no scope for doubt – there can be no intermediary position. If the hypothesis has 
prior as zero, p(h)=0, then the numerator in equation (2) because of the second term is zero, 
and hence, p(h| e)=0. Similarly, if hypothesis has prior as unity, p(h)=1, then from equation 
(1) it follows that p(~h)=0 and as a result the second term in the denominator of equation (2) 
is zero, note that the remaining part of denominator is equal to the numerator, thus, p(h| e)=1. 
In both the cases when prior is a fundamentalist belief then the posterior also retains the 
fundamentalist belief.  
 
While deriving the above result a basic tenet of Bayesian inference has been violated, that is, 
probabilities are subjective, and hence, cannot be deterministic. This is a very valid point, but 
it turns out that this violation is our strength. What it implies is that if one begins with a 
fundamentalist belief or one is dogmatic then there is no scope for revision. In other words, if 
one believes that a particular thing is true then any amount of conditional evidence that is 
probabilistic in nature will not cut much ice. This has two implications: first, if truth has been 
ascertained and the prior is deterministic then looking for further conditional evidences to 
prove or disprove can be a futile exercise that should be avoided; second, if one is dogmatic 
then it will act as hindrance and all conditional evidences become redundant, thus, growth of 
knowledge is the casualty. Either way the case for deterministic prior is best done away with, 
as taken up in section 5, but for the present purpose, sections 3 and 4, it is these implications 
that are relevant.  
 
3.1 Two Examples 
We will discuss the persistence of fundamentalist belief with two examples. The first one is 
taken from Tycho Brahe’s observations on planetary movements. Brahe (1546-1601) who 
 
“... was both a theorist and an observer. As a theorist, he believed to his last day in the year 
1601 that the planet went round the sun and that the sun and the stars went round the earth as 
the fixed centre of the universe. As an observer, he made with infinite patience and integrity 
thousands of records of the stars and planets; upon these records Kepler, in due course, based 
his laws and brought the truth to light” (Beveridge, 1937, p. 478). 
 
The point that one would like to make here is that Tycho Brahe was believer of the geocentric 
universe of Aristotle and Ptolemy till his death.  But, despite being wrong in his theories he 
was honest and careful in his observations (Beveridge, 1937, p. 479). His observations in the 
pre-telescopic era were remarkable and probably made him ask relevant questions and 
subsequently proposed an alternative that was in between Ptolemaic and Copernican model 
but geocentric that was most widely accepted. However, he erred while rejecting Nicolai 
Copernicus’ (1473-1543) heliocentric system published in On the Revolutions of the 
Heavenly Bodies when he lay on his deathbed; the work was dedicated to the Pope but did 
not find favor with the Church (Guidry, 2002A & 2002B). It is possible that Brahe’s belief in 
the geocentric system prevented him from rigorously pursuing the observations that he 
collected, and thus, could not gain insights form the data. Interestingly enough, Johannes 
Kepler (1571-1630) who believed in the Copernican system used Brahe’s data to obtain the 
results that he did, we will elaborate on this in section 4.1. 
 
Our second example is based on the recent happening of September 11, 2001 at World Trade 
Center, New York. One argues that perpetrators of this and other terrorist attack have a 
fundamentalist belief, that is, they have totalistic ideology (Morgan, 2001B). “The thinking of 
the terrorist evidently shows some of the cognitive faults or distortions observed in others     Page 5 of 11 
 
 
who engage in violent acts, either solely as individuals or as members of a group. These 
include overgeneralization - that is, the supposed sins of the Enemy may spread to encompass 
the entire population. Also, they show dichotomous thinking … either totally good or totally 
bad. Finally, they demonstrate tunnel vision - once they are engaged in their holy mission 
(e.g., jihad), the only objective they can envision is the destruction of the target” (Beck, 
c.2001/02). 
 
The perpetrators consider themselves as victims and the enemy as oppressor and they are 
fighting for a good cause against evil for which they can even lay down their lives. 
Justification in the total conviction and belief might be political or guided by a particular 
interpretation of religion. Similarly, based on the fact that all the terrorist involved in 
September 11, 2001 are Muslims and that they take inspiration from a particular 
interpretation of Islam does not mean that Islam as a religion is responsible for the emergence 
of terrorism (Morgan, 2001A), in fact, as we will elaborate in the next section, Islam can be 
of help in changing the mind of the terrorist. However, existence of a fundamentalist belief 
means that prior is deterministic (say, unity), and hence, further arguments or conditional 
evidences are redundant and will have no impact on posterior. This takes us to the question 
posed in the first paragraph: Does this mean that once a fundamentalist, always a 
fundamentalist? The answer is No. Two different proposals emerge from some further 
discussion of Bayesian updating. A combination of these two, along with other proposals not 
mentioned here, will be relevant in our present concern against terrorism. 
 
4. A Way Out: Conditional Evidence is Complementary to Prior 
In the discussion in section 3, as per Bayesian tradition, it was implicitly assumed that 
conditional evidence is not deterministic, 0<p(e| h)<1, it can not take the value of zero or 
unity. However, for the discussion in this section we waive that assumption and consider a 
situation where p(e| h) is not only deterministic but also diametrically opposite to p(h), that is, 
if p(h)=1 then p(e| h)=0; and if p(h)=0 then p(e| h)=1. Now, if one puts these values in equation 
(2) then the denominator is zero, and hence, p(h| e)=undefined.
4 
 
One can interpret this result to explain situations where scientific experiments give results 
that dispel conventional belief. An undefined posterior could mean that things are not clear 
and it can be such that posteriors can have any value between zero and unity, 0≤p(h| e)≤1. Or, 
in other words it could mean that some people still believe the conventional orthodoxy, others 
go by the new result and yet others whose degree of belief is somewhere in between. This 
interpretation is like Nash’s mass-action interpretation (Kuhn et. al., 1995). Further, from the 
mass-action interpretation it can be said that if there are a series of other experiments that also 
conclusively go against the conventional orthodoxy then there will be a shift in the posterior 
probability distribution towards the new finding: p(h| e)t→ p(e| h)t as t→T>2; this should 
happen at t=2 because as per mass-action interpretation p(h| e)t>0 at t=1. However, in real life 
people may consider a series of different experiments as a single conditional evidence, and 
hence, there will be a time gap when the new idea is accepted across the whole population.
5 
                                                 
4 It is undefined because it is in a position of conflict like Nelkin’s (2000) two standpoints 
where, on the one hand, one believes in laws of nature and in that sense is deterministic, and 
on the other hand, one also believes in freedom and in that sense is for free choice. 
5 This is similar to stating, as Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993, p. 31) point out, that 
uncertainties can lead to inertia.     Page 6 of 11 
 
 
Let us elaborate on this with our two examples of Tycho Brahe and perpetrators of September 
11, 2001 discussed in section 3.1. 
 
4.1 The Two Examples Again 
Tycho Brahe had appointed Johannes Kepler and the two had differences of opinion because 
the latter believed in the Copernican system. Brahe’s distrust of Kepler and fear that the latter 
might use his data led him to restrict Kepler to work on the troublesome data of planet Mars. 
It so happened that it is this data that helped Kepler derive the three planetary laws of motion 
that conclusively proved the heliocentric system (Guidry, 2002C). Thus, Kepler’s result in a 
Bayesian sense is conditional evidence that is diametrically opposite to the prior of geocentric 
system. For the larger population, this would have made the posteriors undefined, that is, 
some people would accept Kepler’s result, others would have continued with the old 
orthodox view and yet others who would have some degree of belief in between the two. In 
the initial days larger number of people would have either believed or their degree of belief 
would have been closer to accepting the geocentric system. However, as more and more 
scientists would have confirmed Kepler’s results then there was a shift to the heliocentric 
system and today we hardly have anybody who will have the belief that the universe is 
geocentric.  
 
In a similar vein one can argue that if the perpetrators of terrorism are conclusively shown 
that their thinking is wrong then contradictory claims would make it chaotic, but would 
initiate a process of change. One feels that this can be done through Islam. As mentioned 
earlier, the perpetrators of September 11, 2001 and organizations like Al Qaida are guided by 
a particular interpretation of Islam. Some of their fatwas mentioned in Morgan (2002) are as 
follows: “All these crimes and sins committed by Americans are a clear declaration of war on 
God, his messenger, and Muslims.”  “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – 
civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim, who can do it in any country it 
is possible to do it.”  “To comply with God’s order to kill Americans, plunder their 
money…We call on all Muslim. ... clerics, youths and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s 
US troops and the Devil’s supporters allying with them.” “Terrorizing the American 
occupiers is a religious and logical obligation.” 
 
In contrast to the fatwas Morgan (2001B) gives some quotations from the Qur’an that are as 
follows: “If you’ve killed one innocent person it’s as if you’ve killed all of humanity.” 
“Among the major sins of Islam is suicide. These are listed as ‘enormities’ in Reliance of the 
Traveller, a manual of Sharia in the tradition of Imam Shafi'i.” “Whoever commits suicide 
with piece of iron will be punished with the same piece of iron in the Hell Fire…He who 
commits suicide by throttling shall keep on throttling himself in the Hell Fire (forever) and he 
who commits suicide by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing himself in the Hell-Fire. 
(Narrated Jundab the Prophet Sahih Bukhari 2.445 and 2.446).” “Nor take life - which Allah 
has made sacred - except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his 
heir authority (to demand retaliation or to forgive): but let him not exceed bounds in the 
matter of taking life (Qur’an, 17:33).” “Fight in the cause of Allah with those who fight with 
you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits 
(Qur’an, 2:190-192).” “We must treat the enemy civilians and the innocents with kindness.” 
 
It is appropriate to consider that the above quotations from Qur’an can act as perfect counter 
to the Al Qaida’s interpretation of Islam. An effort in this direction from the religious 
authorities of Islam would be effective because the perpetrators belief is identified with a     Page 7 of 11 
 
 
fight for their religious cause. It is only through more authentic and authoritative 
interpretations of Islam that one can replace the erroneous, regressive and conservative 
interpretation of organizations like Al Qaida. This is similar to the Church’s role in replacing 
the once popular geocentric view with that of the heliocentric view.  
 
However, this approach should be considered only after addressing some of the other 
conditions that make Al Qaida’s fatwas widely acceptable. Here one is referring to the 
political dimension or the reference in the fatwas to the act of Americans and its allies. 
Religion is invoked to fight against some political injustice. In other words, the fatwas and 
preaching of Qur’an that look contradictory can be held together, as Martin (2002) while 
analysing consensus and tightness of beliefs in communities of smaller groups (5-40 
members) suggests, through the same domains of authority via webs of implications. Thus, if 
the fight is for a religious cause (jihad) then dying for this cause (not suicide) and in the 
process killing the enemy becomes acceptable. It may be reiterated that the identification of 
the enemy is not just religious, but it is also political.  
 
The relevance of a political dimension comes out clearly in Wanniski (2001) who gives an 
extract of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef statement to court in his trial for bombing the World Trade 
Centre on February 26, 1993 where six people died, Yousef was sentenced for life 
imprisonment on January 8, 1998. Yousef’s statement refers to American action in bombing 
Japan, war with Vietnam, and more particularly its embargo on Iraq and Cuba. In this context 
he has no regrets in being called a terrorist. He says: “Yes, I am a terrorist and I am proud of 
it. And I support terrorism so long as it was against the United States Government and against 
Israel, because you are more than terrorists; you are the one who invented terrorism and using 
it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.” It is this political dimension that will be 
taken up in the next section by putting a restriction that prior cannot be deterministic. 
 
5 Prior cannot be Deterministic: Giving Space to Others 
In section 3 the discussion more or less assumed that probability can be deterministic – zero 
or unity, somewhat contrary to Bayesian philosophy that is based on subjective probability. 
We now consider that prior, as also conditional evidence, and posterior can be infinitesimally 





where ε is infinitesimally small, but greater than zero, or, one can also further restrict the 
boundary such that ε can be little larger, 0<ε<0.5. 
 
Now, if one gets conditional evidence that is contrary to prior then a series of such 
experiments will bring out a change in posterior in the direction of conditional evidence but 
can never attain a value that is zero or unity. In other words, if p(h) 1>0.5 and p(e| h)t>0.5 then 
p(h| e)t→1 as t→T=∞, note that by equation (4) p(h| e)t≠1 indicating that the posterior tends 
towards unity in a limiting sense but it will never be equal to it. 
 
                                                 
6 For deviation of probability from being deterministic by infinitesimal values and its 
relevance to calculation of posteriors see Arló-Costa (2001).     Page 8 of 11 
 
 
In equation (4), particularly when ε is not infinitesimally small the conditional evidence will 
also be constrained by the limits possible to posterior,
7 or in other words the limits to 
posterior is itself a part of the prior information. Such restriction of equations (4), for the 
context under discussion, is akin to acceptance of multiple views – they cannot be dismissed 
outright. 
 
To elaborate, if Bayesian updating is like a Darwinian evolutionary process of natural 
selection then principle of heredity (off springs have to resemble their parents more than other 
members of their species) and the principle of the struggle for existence (better-adapted 
individuals have more number of off springs) can be explained by replication dynamics.
8 This 
might ignore the principle of variation or diversity in the population,
9 a necessary prerequisite 
in the process of natural selection.
10 In other words, if interaction between sub-groups is 
necessary then a process where all the other sub-groups perish can be self-defeating.
11 Thus, 
continuity requires that there should be perturbation at some period that at least prevents some, 
if not all, sub-groups from not perishing in the process of interaction.
12 
 
Accepting multiple views warrants that we give space to others. In the present concern 
against terrorism it means understanding the concerns of Middle East. This also means 
appreciating their point of view or grievances. For instance, the impact of depleted Uranium 
used in Gulf War of 1991 on the rise of cancer and birth defects in Iraq (Johnson, 2002).
13 
                                                 
7 This can be because of perturbation or random disturbances. We consider this randomness, 
following Kumar (2000), to be an outcome of the privileged information of various agents 
including that of nature. 
8 Rplicator dynamics has been explained in Börgers (1996, p. 1382), as "a gradual process in 
which strategies which perform worse than the average become less frequent and strategies 
which perform better than the average become more frequent." 
9 Mukherjee, White and Wuyts (1998, p. 3) quote Gould (1996, p. 40) to suggest that: “we are 
still suffering from a legacy as old as Plato, a tendency to abstract a single ideal or average as 
the ‘essence’ of a system, and to devalue or ignore, variation among the individuals that 
constitute the whole population.” 
10 This interpretation of the principles of natural selection involving heredity, struggle for 
existence, and variation has been based on an understanding of Gould (1991) and Visvanathan 
(1996). 
11 Krieger (1995) suggests that the probability of such self-defeating scenarios (that is, doom) 
is either zero or unity through an application of Kolmogorov probability theory for scenarios 
with lower tails in their distribution. There are instances where birth rank is used as Bayesian 
conditional to show that the probability of doomsday is zero, but Eckhardt (1997) shows that 
it is an improper use of evidence as conditional evidence (also see note 2 above). 
12 This can be because of randomness arising out of privileged information (see note 7). In a 
Darwinian sense this can be as a result of mutation and it is this that ensures variation (see 
discussions that led to notes 9 and 10). Thus, it is not necessary for p(e| h)t>0.5, it can also be 
the case that p(e| h)t<0.5. By restricting the boundary of p(·), as in equation (4), one ensures a 
minimum variation necessary for interaction and such restrictions, one feels, will also 
constrain the Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993) long-run equilibria. 
13 On denial of clemency to Mir Aimal Kasi one lost another opportunity of showing concern 
and winning a million hearts in the fight against terrorism. Note that Mr Kasi, a Pakistani 
citizen, was executed with lethal injection on November 14, 2002 for having killed two     Page 9 of 11 
 
 
This not only requires an initiation of dialogue and conversation at multiple levels such as 
government-to-government and people-to-people but an involvement in positive action. 
Further, note that conversations also have an ability to change beliefs and a reliance on 
conversational stance necessitates that people consider each other as responsible and free 
believers and desirers (Pettit & Smith, 1996). Moves in this direction will give a lot of 
strength to the Islamic religious authorities in countering the wrong invoking of Islam in the 
fatwas. We have further elaborated on this in the conclusions.  
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we try to understand fundamentalist belief through Bayesian updating, that is, 
when priors are deterministic. Doing away with a basic Bayesian philosophy of subjective 
probability turns out to be the strength in the present discussion because it can also explain 
persistence of fundamentalist belief. This result is used to explain why Brahe fails to go 
beyond geocentric consideration whereas Kepler using Brahe’s data conclusively proves the 
heliocentric view. The role of belief including experiences and views of correct scientific 
inquiry has also influenced research in probability: Sir Ronald A. Fisher concerned with 
reduction and evaluation of experimental data believed and developed tools and methods as a 
frequentist, whereas Sir Harold Jeffreys who tried to calculate the internal structure of the 
earth was aware that conclusions will always be uncertain made important contributions as a 
Byesian (Howie, 2002). Belief (not necessarily fundamentalist) but at least in a subjective 
sense has also had an impact on many great scientists (Press and Tanur, 2001). 
 
As Kepler’s result led to a shift in popular belief from geocentric to heliocentric view of 
universe, one feels that the involvement of Islamic religious authorities can act as an effective 
counter to the terrorist organizations who issue fatwas by invoking Islam. However, to create 
ground for the effective use of religion one has to take care of another condition that affects 
the fundamentalist mind – the political dimension in the fatwas.  
 
To analyse this we make use of the conventional understanding of subjective probability, that 
is, it lies between zero and unity. One can also suggest a higher lower bound and a lower 
upper bound depending upon the context and this can be considered as part of the prior. This 
can be interpreted in social situations as one where multiple scenarios co-exist and form the 
basis for interaction. The role of interaction can be gauged from the fact that Hindu-Muslim 
conflicts in India are prevalent in those cities where associational interactions between them 
are absent (Varshney, 2002).  
 
Having identified the relevance of interaction in the political dimension it suggests that the 
world ought to be accommodative and appreciative about the views of Middle East. If Islam 
has to play a positive role in countering the role for fatwa then conditions from outside should 
make it convenient. This requires a respect and appreciation for the other viewpoints. This 
approach, however, does not deny difference of opinion but rather consider this necessary for 
discussions and debates, a basic requirement in a civil society. 
 
We do agree that the above two approaches proposed to be used in conjunction with each 
other do not exhaust all possible suggestions of tackling terrorism. This is consistent to our 
discussions using Bayesian updating in two ways. First, we are not dogmatic of our proposals 
                                                                                                                                                        
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees and wounding three others on January 5 1993 
in front of CIA headquarters Virginia (Glod & Weiss, 2002).     Page 10 of 11 
 
 
and agree that these can only form a small part in our concern against terrorism. Second, by 
considering the existence of other possible methods we leave scope for multiple views. In 
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